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The role of expertise in dynamic risk assessment: a 
reflection of the problem solving strategies used by 
experienced fireground commanders 
 
 Although the concept of dynamic risk assessment in recent times has become more topical in 
the training manuals of most high risk domains, only a few studies have reported how experts 
actually carry out this crucial task in actual settings. The knowledge gap between research and 
practice in this area therefore calls for more empirical investigation. In this paper, we present 
and discuss the problem solving strategies employed by sixteen experienced operational 
firefighters using a qualitative knowledge elicitation tool known as the critical decision method. 
Findings revealed that dynamic risk assessment is not merely a process of weighing the risks of 
a proposed course of action against its benefits, but rather an experiential and pattern recognition 
process. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of designing training curriculum 
for the less experienced officers using the elicited expert knowledge.         
Key words: Dynamic risk assessment; experts; firefighting; decision making; pattern-
recognition; training  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
A building on fire poses a serious threat to human lives, properties, livestock, communities, 
local economies, natural resources and the environment at large (McLennan, Holgate, Omodei 
and Wearing, 2006). The dynamic and extremely dramatic environment where these events 
occur further increases the possibility of exposing firefighters to all sorts of risks and task 
constraints, most of which stem from the need to manage uncertainties, ensure the safety of 
crew members, rescue trapped victims, manage members of the public, adhere to statutory 
obligations binding fire fighters, and verify media perceptions (Burke and Hendry, 1997; 
Ingham, 2007; Grimwood, 2003; Lipshitz et al, 2001; Perry and Wiggins, 2008; Kahneman 
and Klein, 2009; Clancy, 2011). The nature of these environments also explain why firefighters 
sometimes encounter novel and difficult situations, despite being equipped with advanced 
equipment and gadgets such as breathing apparatus, fire resistant clothing and all sorts of hose-
lines.  
 
For instance, the excerpt below from the work of Flin (1996) illustrates a typical fireground 
scenario and highlights some of the complexities associated with fireground decision making 
mostly under time pressure: 
 
‘On arrival at the scene of a fire, officers are bombarded with a mass of visual and 
other information relating to the incident, its progress and its context. On a short 
time scale, often under great pressure, the officer in charge must grasp the situation, 
understand the problem being faced, prioritize fire service actions on the basis of 
reasonable strategy, deploy available resources, know when to ask for 
reinforcements and what these should be’ (Flin, 1996:140) 
             
To cope with these fast paced events, fireground commanders often employ an important 
cognitive task known as dynamic risk assessment which, as the term suggests, must be 
conducted rapidly. The concept of dynamic risk assessment (DRA) has thus proved of worth 
in promoting thinking about managing dynamic risks in the fire service, and its ability to 
closely link risk taking behaviour to decision making also implies there is now raised awareness 
about the cognitive architecture of incident commanders than ever before (Grimwood, 2003; 
Tissington and Flin, 2005; HM Government, 2008; Ingham, 2008; Klein et al, 2010; Clancy, 
2011). But despite its growing awareness amongst scholars, the concept of dynamic risk 
assessment has been accused of being quite subjective and therefore difficult to measure as a 
scientific construct (see Tissington and Flin, 2005 for details). For instance, it is not yet entirely 
clear from the procedures binding most high risk domains the exact points where officers 
should follow the basic firefighting rules and where relying on previous knowledge would 
prove more appropriate (Burke, 1997; Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002; Klein, 2003; Lipshitz 
et al, 2007; Marewski, Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer, 2010).  
 
Against the above background, the current paper therefore seeks to examine how expertise 
facilitates and informs the dynamic risk assessment process. By so doing, the dominant 
problem solving strategy employed by the sixteen fire ground incident commanders that 
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participated in the study will be assessed. The motivation for the study was partly hinged on 
the fact that only very few empirical studies have reported how experts actually carry out this 
crucial task of dynamic risk assessment, despite being an important theme in the incident 
command training manual (HM fire inspectorate, 1999; HM Government, 2008). This 
knowledge gap is perceived to have implications for research and practice and therefore 
requires more empirical investigation. It is hence believed that capturing the role of expertise 
in the dynamic risk assessment process is likely to enhance the design of training programmes 
for the less experienced fire officers, particularly at this present time where the frequency of 
occurrence of serious fire incidents has been on a decline.  
 
Expertise and dynamic risk assessment 
As with many other work practices, the firefighting domain is made up of several standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) that guide safe performances at the incident ground (Klein et al, 
2010; Lamb et al, 2014). These SOPs are a combination of the technical procedures (e.g. using 
the right type of equipment such as hosereel, mainjet, ladder, fireman axe etc.) as well as the 
modus operandi of managing incidents (e.g. splitting crews between the front and back of a 
building). For example, one of the rule-based risk philosophies that have been widely accepted 
in the UK fire service states that: 
 ‘Firefighters will take ‘some’ risk to save saveable lives’ 
 ‘Firefighters will take ‘a little’ risk to save saveable property’ 
 ‘Firefighters will ‘not take any risk at all’ to try to save lives or property that are 
already lost’ (HM Fire Service Inspectorate, 1999; HM Government, 2008)  
 
But while it is worth acknowledging that rules and philosophical principles of these sorts are 
useful in most high risk domains as they help establish risk tolerance levels for operators, what 
remains a challenge is finding an appropriate way of evaluating phrases such as ‘some risk’, ‘a 
little risk’ and ‘any risk at all’. A number of studies have suggested that experts often make 
decisions about what is risky/not in dynamic and time-pressured conditions mainly through 
experiential knowledge (Shanteau, 1992; Wong, 2000; Fessey, 2002; Adams, 2003; 
Grimwood, 2003; Perry and Wiggins, 2008; Rosen, Shuffler and Salas, 2010; Okoli et al, 
2013). For instance, the fact that a particular procedure is labelled high risk in the fire manual 
does not necessarily always imply that incident commanders must take a defensive (or risk 
averse) position when such situations are encountered in real life; some level of risks must still 
be accepted and managed based on experience. So considering the huge expectations members 
of public usually hold for the response teams, it only becomes logical to expect that managing 
more dangerous and unpredictable fires will require the skills and knowledge of the more 
experienced officers. 
 
According to Shanteau (1992), experts are ‘those who have been recognized within their 
profession as having the necessary skills and abilities to perform at the highest level’. Research 
on expertise has provided ample evidence to show that experts are able to use their existing 
 
 
knowledge to facilitate situation assessment and gain perceptual advantage as events unfold 
(Chase and Simon, 1973; Calderwod et al, 1987; Endsley, 1995; Gobet and Simon, 1996; 
Dreyfus, 2004; Feldon, 2007; Dane and Pratt, 2009; Rosen, Shuffler and Salas, 2010). On this 
note, a number of authors have therefore suggested that experts are not necessarily better than 
novices because they think faster or possess a wider range of skills, but because they are able 
to organize and apply their knowledge and skills better ― through a schema-based network. It 
is the operation of schemas that make the process of information retrieval from memory much 
easier and thus allow experts to see more easily what is invisible to novices, such as the 
identification of patterns, relationships and potential consequences of action (Sweller, 1994; 
Gobet, 2005; Hilbig, Scholl and Pohl, 2010).  
 
But what is dynamic risk assessment? The DRA model (See for example Clancy, 2011; 
Tissington and Flin, 2005; HM Government, 2008) requires that fireground commanders: 
 
 Continuously monitor and evaluate a situation, the tasks, the people and properties at 
risk 
 Select the most appropriate systems of operation 
 Assess and re-assess the chosen systems of operation 
 Introduce additional controls if required 
 Modify and implement action plans as events unfold 
 
The strength of the DRA model is therefore evident from its flexibility, since it provides actors 
with an opportunity to make quick decisions e.g. whether to stick with the ‘gold standard’ ways 
of doing things or make some level of adjustments to existing rules. The model is thus unique 
in that it acknowledges that decision making on the fireground does not follow a static or linear 
model as often postulated by the classical theorists, but is rather dependent on various 
environmental and informational cues in the environment (Okoli et al, 2014; Ericsson et al, 
2007; Harré, Bossomaier, and Synder, 2012).  
 
Problem solving strategies on the fireground: Rule, skill and knowledge based decisions  
 
The notion that experts are able to perform recurrent aspects of tasks using their extensive 
domain knowledge has been well reported in the literature (Sweller, 1994; Dreyfus, 2004; 
Hoffman et al, 1998; Paas, Renkl and Sweller, 2004; Pollock et al, 2002). These authors 
attributed this ability mainly to the efficient functioning of a powerful information processing 
tool known as schema. A schema contains rules and procedures that can systematically link 
particular features of a problem to its possible course of action (IF condition, THEN action). 
Without an adequate knowledge about a particular procedure, skills cannot be transferred for 
solving difficult problems (Feldon, 2007). Hence, one of the features of higher level 
competence is that knowledge becomes increasingly ‘proceduralized’ and readily converted 
into skills. Simply ‘knowing that’ (declarative knowledge) is not enough for most job tasks in 
high reliability organizations such as firefighting, but knowing what to do with what is already 
known, as well as knowing how to combine what is known differently have been shown to be 
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of greater importance in such domains (Wong, 2000). Experts often form their action plans and 
solve new problems using the general knowledge they have about a domain, or the knowledge 
they recall from concrete cases, or both. A direct relationship therefore seems to exist between 
the skills possessed by an expert, their knowledge of the domain and the domain rules that guide 
their actions. Ingham (2007) puts it this way: 
 
‘The application of standard rules does not mean that incident commanders are not 
creative. Working without rules is uninteresting, and absolute liberty is boring. The 
creation of innovative approaches does not happen in a vacuum; rather it is the result 
of playing with the rules, stretching them, moving and testing them. It is therefore 
essential to maintain common operating guidelines, or rules, because they form a 
stock body of common knowledge, but it is also essential to break the rules and play 
around with them because mastery reveals itself as breaking rules. The secret of 
creativity hinges on this insight: to know the right moment when one can go too far’ 
(Ingham 2007: section 24) 
                                                                              
Because it is not very clear how experts transit from one problem solving strategy to another 
and in what particular circumstance they make such transition, this paper also aims to examine 
the boundaries that exist between formal (rule based) and dynamic (adaptive or creative) risk 
assessment methods, and when experts are likely to apply which.  
 
Methodology 
The Critical Decision Method 
This study hinges on the naturalistic decision making (NDM) paradigm which has been 
regarded as both a theoretical and methodological framework (Lipshitz et al, 2001). In the 
NDM community, researchers are mainly interested in capturing the cognitive strategies that 
aid experts’ performance while managing real-life incidents. Studies in this domain are 
therefore specifically designed to examine how experts make decisions in the real world using 
their experience and domain knowledge (Kaempf et al, 1996; Zsambok, 1997; Hoffman, 
Crandall, and Shadbolt, 1998; Wong, 2004; Klein, 2008). As Kahneman and Klein (2009) put 
it:  
‘A central goal of NDM is to demystify intuition by identifying the cues that experts 
use to make their judgments, even if those cues involve tacit knowledge and are 
difficult for the expert to articulate. In this way, NDM researchers try to learn from 
expert professionals’ (Kahneman and Klein, 2009:516) 
 
Since firefighting is one of the domains that heavily rely on explanations from qualified experts 
in an attempt to better understand the cognitive rules and pre-requisite knowledge that aid 
optimum performance, it therefore became important to apply a knowledge elicitation tool in 
this study. Knowledge elicitation tools are structured protocols designed to assist experts to 
explain what they both know and do in their domains of practice. The study utilized the critical 
decision method (CDM) mainly because of its credibility and popularity in the cognitive task 
 
 
analysis literature (for details of the CDM see Klein, Calderwood, and MacGregor, 1989; 
Hoffman et al, 1995; Wong, 2004). The CDM is a retrospective interview strategy that applies 
a set of cognitive probes to actual non-routine tasks (high-risk incidents). The CDM probes 
allow experts to be questioned in-depth as to how they were able to manage a particular incident 
(see ‘procedure’ section below). Through the CDM protocol we were able to capture interesting 
themes that underpin experts’ competence, which includes the knowledge and skills used in 
making complex decisions, the types of information used and their sources, the cues sought at 
each decision point, the rules being followed (both cognitive and domain rules), the goals and 
sub-goals pursued, the amount of time spent on each decision, and the type of training that was 
most helpful in making each decision. 
 
The CDM has been used in a wide range of studies (See Hoffman et al, 1995 for a review) and 
its strength lies in the fact that it is: (i) capable of demystifying the rationale behind experts’ 
decision-making and problem solving strategies (ii) applicable under field conditions i.e. 
naturalistic settings (iii) useful for providing relevant information that can facilitate the design 
of instructional curricula for training novices e.g. less experienced firefighters could potentially 
be trained on how best to assess a situation based on the knowledge elicited from experts.  
 
Although the CDM has gained dominance over the past few years as one of the most effective 
knowledge elicitation methods, its major criticism still remains that it cannot completely 
control the effect of memory limitations in human beings. Sceptics believe it is quite difficult 
to narrate a retrospective incident without either missing out some vital information or making 
up additional information. However, a number of empirical studies involving interview with 
experienced fire officers (e.g. Klein et al, 1988; McLennan et al, 2006; Burke and Hendry, 
1997; Okoli et al, 2013) seemed to have challenged these claims. Despite some of the 
limitations that have been linked with retrospective verbal protocols, proponents of the critical 
decision method have demonstrated the effectiveness and reliability of the method for eliciting 
expert knowledge. This study provides additional evidence to substantiate existing belief that 
experienced officers do not easily forget non-routine incidents for which their skills and 
expertise were challenged; this includes incidents dated even as far back as 10 years.  
 
Participants and Procedure 
The sample size for this study comprised sixteen experienced fire-fighters (n=16), selected 
across different major fire stations in the UK (n=6) and Nigeria (n=10). The participants were 
carefully selected on the basis of their rank/position and also through peer nomination; this was 
to ensure that expertise is verified and not assumed (see Table 1). Since this study aims to elicit 
the knowledge and skills used by experienced fire commanders, it became crucial to ensure 
that only the most qualified experts were recruited. As a result, the authors ensured that all the 
participants that were interviewed had personally been involved in managing real-life fire 
incidents, which meant they had at least operated as incident commander (i.e. managing crews 
and leading one or more fire engines). In addition, all the participants recruited for the interview 
were supervisory managers (i.e. crew commanders, watch commanders and station managers), 
group commanders and flexi-duty officers; all ordinary fire-fighter were exempted from 
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participating. One of the most important factors that differentiate supervisory managers from 
ordinary firefighters is the quality of training received by the former. The incident command 
and control training covers more advanced subjects in areas like decision making, personnel 
and resource management, breathing apparatus entry procedures, fire investigation, 
sectorization, team management, situation assessment and size up etc.  Hence, it was important 
to ensure that all participants in this study had received incident command training and have 
managed a good number of complex incidents in the course of their firefighting career. The 
average length of experience for all the sixteen participants is 18.5 years (see Table 1). As 
shown in Figure 1, participants were first asked to recall and ‘walk-through’ a memorable fire 
incident that particularly challenged their expertise. 
 
Fig 1. A visual presentation of the steps involved in the critical decision making process 
(Adapted from Klein, Calderwood, and MacGregor, 1989) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INCIDENT 
 
Start time                      INCIDENT TIMELINE                   End time 
                           IDENTIFICATION OF DECISION POINTS 
                                 APPLICATION OF COGNITIVE PROBES 
A SUMMARY OF THE CDM PROCEDURE 
Decision Point 2 
Cues sought 
Knowledge used 
Goals pursued 
Actions taken 
Decision Point 3 
Cues sought 
Knowledge used 
Goals pursued 
Actions taken 
Decision Point 1 
Cues sought 
Knowledge used 
Goals pursued 
Actions taken 
 
 
Procedure 
 
Participants were informed in advance either through an email or a phone call about the nature 
of the interview and were told the type of incidents that were of interest to the study i.e. non-
routine or atypical incidents. The rationale for limiting the choice of incidents to non-routine 
ones is because experts tend to rely more on their tacit knowledge when solving difficult tasks 
than they will normally do when performing routine tasks (Polanyi, 1962; Eraut, 2000).  
 
After narrating the incident from start to finish, participants were asked to go over the incident 
again, but this time with the intention of constructing a timeline (i.e. making a summary of key 
decisions made from the start of the incident to when it was brought under control). During 
timeline construction, decision points were also identified: A decision point, which is the basic 
unit of analysis in this study, is defined as the point where participants admitted choosing a 
specific course of action where other potential alternatives were available. Some examples of 
decision points include: ‘I committed my crews with breathing apparatus into the building’, ‘I 
withdrew my crews from the building because it was too risky’, ‘I requested more appliances 
because I thought we didn’t have enough at the time’ (see Table 2). The timeline construction 
and decision point identification phases were then followed by probing each decision point 
using a set of cognitive probes. The CDM probes which were specifically structured to enhance 
the knowledge elicitation process contained a series of semi-structured interview questions 
covering some of the themes that were outlined earlier (see Hoffman, Crandall, and Shadbolt, 
1998 for details of the CDM procedure).  
 
Each interview lasted between 1hr-2.5hr and was tape recorded with the consent of each 
participant. A total of 65 decision points were obtained across the sixteen incidents. The 
interviews were transcribed verbatim and analysed using a combination of a qualitative coding 
process and the emergent themes analytical method developed by Wong (2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Results and findings 
 
Table 1: Demographic characteristics of participants 
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Pseudonym Years of 
experience  
Position/rank Nature of 
incident 
Major task constraints 
UK FIREFIGHTERS 
 
 
Adrian 
 
 
17                Watch 
commander 
 
 
 
House fire (Arson) 
 Dealing with a victim who had 
mental health issues 
 Having to turn the incident to a 
welfare issue 
 
 
 
 
Patrick 
 
 
 
 
32 
Asst. Fire chief 
 
 
 
 
 
Petrol storage fire 
 Difficulty in finding the seat of 
fire 
 Pollution of the water courses 
 Fire growing bigger after 4hrs 
of active firefighting 
  
 
 
 
Dickson 
 
 
 
23 Crew 
commander 
 
 
 
Garage workshop 
fire 
 A massive fire resulting from 
acetylene explosion 
 Having to fight the fire from a 
more defensive position 
 
 
 
    Brown 
 
 
 
       27 
Crew 
commander 
 
 
 
 
Garage workshop 
fire 
 The need to simultaneously 
carry out firefighting and rescue 
operations 
 Multi-Agency coordination 
 Treating a victim with 30% 
burns 
 Managing public emotions  
 
 
 
 
 
Lilian 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
Director in 
command 
 
 
 
 
 
Bush fire 
 The need to evacuate victims to 
a safe distance 
 Difficulty in providing shelter 
for evacuees 
 Heavy wind negatively 
affecting task performance 
 
       
    
     Jade 
 
 
 
15 
Crew 
Commander 
 
 
 
Residential house 
fire 
 Access difficulty  
 Limited work space making 
response effort difficult  
 Preventing the fire from 
spreading to other surrounding 
buildings (incident was at the 
heart of the city center) 
NIGERIAN FIREFIGHTERS 
 
 
 
 
Young 
 
 
 
 
8 
Fire Supt officer 
 
 
 
Road traffic 
explosion 
 Loss of human lives 
 Managing the emotional 
outbursts of public members  
 Multi-Agency coordination 
 The need to carry out rescue and 
firefighting tasks  
simultaneously  
Kevin 8 
Watch 
commander 
Residential house 
fire 
 Heavy wind negatively 
affecting task performance 
 Preventing the fire from 
spreading to other surrounding 
buildings 
Sammy 8 
Fire supt. officer 
Warehouse fire  Difficulty in gaining access to 
the seat of fire 
 Thick and poisonous emissions 
from the smoke thereby making 
response effort difficult  
 Coping with public intrusion  
 
 
 
 
For the purpose of this study, the phrase ‘problem solving strategy’ refers to the behavior which 
fire ground commanders display while responding to complex fire ground tasks. In one of his 
early studies, Rasmussen (1983) developed a construct that outlined three types of such 
behaviours: rule based behaviour, skill based behaviour and knowledge based behaviour. 
Drawing on Rasmussen’s idea, each decision point in this study was classified as any of 
standard, typical or creative as discussed below: 
 
Standard decisions 
These are decisions for which every officer would normally know what to do i.e. the standard 
way of doing things in the fire service. The decisions that fell within this category include 
points where experts were basically following fire-fighting rules, standard operating 
Knight 8 
Watch 
commander 
School building fire  Managing public emotions 
 The need to prevent the fire 
from spreading further 
Adams 30 Chief fire supt. School building fire  Pressure to contain the fire and 
prevent further damage  
 Ensuring safety of crew 
members amidst uncertainty    
Ryan 8 Fire supt. officer Residential house 
fire 
 Access difficulty to the seat of 
fire 
 Risk of electrocution resulting 
from direct firefighting on an 
electrical appliance 
Marvin 30 Station Manager Train explosion  Novelty of the incident; never 
managed train fire before 
 The need to carry out rescue and 
firefighting tasks  
simultaneously 
 Carrying out rescue activities 
on a moving train 
Atkinson 8 Watch 
commander 
Petrol storage fire  Massive fire due to petrol 
explosion 
 Pressure to avoid further 
explosion with combustible 
materials all around the vicinity  
 Managing public emotions 
 Managing media scrutiny 
 
Jack 
30 Chief fire supt.     
Furniture factory 
fire 
 
 Heavy wind negatively 
affecting task performance 
 Sourcing and managing water 
supply 
 Risk of electrical explosion in 
the area due to the effect of the 
wind on the power source   
 
Sunny 29 Asst. Chief fire 
supt. 
Office fire  Difficulty in gaining access to 
the seat of fire  
 Presence of combustible 
materials in the building 
 Pressure to save valuable assets 
and important documents in the 
office  
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procedures or fire manuals. The fire-fighting profession, being a high risk job by its very nature, 
entails that officers follow some domain rules and procedures e.g. rules of communication 
between the operational team and the control room, rules for committing firemen into a 
building with breathing apparatus, rules for evacuating victims within certain distance away 
from the scene of incidents (see Table 2). Some of the participants emphasized the importance 
of following domain rules where possible, claiming those rules are actually there to ensure 
tasks are effectively carried out within the brackets of safety. 
 
Participants were carefully probed regarding the standard rules they were following at each 
decision point, if any. Each decision point was carefully matched against both the incident 
timeline and cognitive probes, and then coded as ‘standard’ if any of the decisions was reported 
by experts as ‘the normal way of doing things’. Care was taken to differentiate between 
decision points where experts were strictly adhering to standard rules (standard rules) and 
where they were making adaptations to the rules (typical rules). For example, recognizing the 
need to request additional resources on the fireground was coded under the standard (or rule 
based) category, but knowing the actual time to request the resources and/or providing an 
estimate of the amount of resources required was coded as typical since some modifications 
has now been made to the SOPs (see table 2 for examples). Hence, as shown in Fig 2 below, 
24.6% of all decision points fell into the rule based category.  
 
Table 2 Analysis of rule based, adaptive and creative decisions from selected decision points 
Actions (Decision points)  Is this a Standard 
operational 
procedure in the 
fire service? (Y/N) 
How participants approached each decision 
point 
Standard  
 
(Knowing 
that) 
Typical   
 
(Knowing 
when & 
Knowing  how) 
Creative 
 
(combining bits 
and pieces of 
information to 
form a story) 
Assessing the situation upon arrival at the 
scene of incident  
 
Y 
 
  
    X 
 
       X 
 
Ensuring that BA sets are well monitored 
upon committing crews into a building 
 
Y 
 
 
    X 
  
Ensuring communication between operational 
team and control room i.e. every 10mins at 
the start of an incident, and then every 20 
mins as the incident dies down 
 
 
Y 
 
  
 
       X 
 
Evacuating the fire crews within a radius of 
200m in the involvement of acetylene or LPG 
cylinders 
 
Y 
 
 
    X 
 
   
 
           X 
Requesting extra resources  
Y 
 
    X 
 
       X 
 
 
Using the appropriate firefighting medium 
e.g. Hosereel or Mainjet 
 
Y 
 
 
    X 
 
       X 
 
 
 
Requesting assistance from other emergency 
response organizations such as Police, 
Ambulance, Road safety, civil defence 
 
 
Y 
 
 
 
 
    
 
       X 
 
Getting to the scene of an incident through the 
nearest route and as soon as possible 
 
Y 
 
   
    X 
  
Ensuring firefighters are committed in pairs 
into a well-alight building 
 
 
                  Y 
 
     
     X 
  
Climbing the ladder to the roof of the 
building, or breaking difficult walls to be able 
to gain access to the seat of fire 
 
N 
  
 
        X 
 
 
          X 
Notifying control room when switching from 
defensive to offensive strategy 
 
Y 
 
   
 
         X 
 
Taking over from a less ranked commander at 
the scene of an incident   
 
Y 
  
         X 
 
Sourcing for water in an area with low 
pressure or no hydrants  
                   
                  Y 
   
           X 
 Note: It should be noted that the categorization process was solely context-based, which explains 
why some decision points had the three problem solving strategies represented.  
 
The participants however reported that they are often forced to either neglect or adapt 
firefighting rules to suit current circumstances, especially if such rules have been judged less 
profitable, through dynamic risk assessment. This problem solving style is discussed next: 
Adaptive decisions 
These are decisions that required modifications or refinements to the standard way of doing 
things in solving a particular task. The CDM reports showed that one of the hallmarks of 
expertise is recognizing when and where following standard rules are likely to be flawed and 
adjusting response plans accordingly. Decisions that fell into this category include those for 
which experts showed a high level of flexibility and adaptivity in solving a particular problem.  
 
Analysis of the decision points showed that 63.1% of the overall decisions fell within this 
problem solving category, suggesting that the majority of decisions made by expert officers 
were skill-based and adaptive (see Fig 2). For example, one of the participants Patrick (32, 
Assistant Fire Chief, UK)1 reported how he over-ruled the decision of a less experienced officer 
who was at the verge of requesting 12 additional pumps, asking him to increase the number of 
pumps 15 instead. Patrick reported making this intuitive decision after seeing the magnitude of 
the fire and its huge potential for spread. Another experienced participant, Adam (Chief Fire 
Superintendent, 30, Nigeria), also reported how he instructed his crew to utilize a hosereel (a 
                                                          
1 Note that participants’ rank and years of experience are displayed in parenthesis next to their names 
(pseudonyms) for ease of reference.   
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type of hose that produces small quantity of water but with very high pressure) instead of a 
mainjet (a very big hose that produces large quantity of water but with less pressure). Adam 
explained that although using a mainjet would have probably been the most appropriate 
firefighting medium judging by the size of the fire, it could have in turn increased the possibility 
of the building to collapse, especially as cracks had already been spotted on walls. Therefore 
unlike the standard decision making strategy, adaptive decisions extend beyond merely 
“knowing that” to also include, more importantly, “knowing how” and/or “knowing when” 
(see decision points in Table 2).   
 
 
Figure 2: Frequency distribution of the problem solving strategies used by participants 
Creative decisions 
These are decisions which typically require creative problem solving strategies. In this problem 
solving category, no direct rules exist regarding how things should be done and pattern 
recognition is usually impossible because of the high level of novelty associated with the 
incident (see Cohen et al, 1998; Klein et al, 2010). In these circumstances, experts are obliged 
to make things work through improvisation, story building (combining bits of elements 
together to create a satisficing tactic) and creative insights.  
 
As part of the cognitive probes, as with the other problem solving strategies, participants were 
asked to clarify at each decision point whether they were following any rules or whether they 
were being creative. They were also asked to explain why they think they were being creative 
 
 
i.e. if they admitted to being creative. Hence, a decision point is coded as creative if participants 
were able to demonstrate that they were making use of their ‘out of the box’ knowledge.  As 
shown in Figure 2, 12.3% of all decisions made by the experts were found to be creative 
 
Although the perception and interpretation of what makes up a creative decision differed across 
the incidents and also amongst experts, three parameters were generally used by the experts to 
define what a creative decision is: 
(i) Decisions that entailed making significant changes to an action plan i.e. moving from doing 
what is typical to expressing acts of “heroism”.  Heroic acts in this context means going the 
extra mile in finding alternative ways of doing things — even if it meant going beyond the 
boundaries of one’s comfort zone in order to save lives and properties. Below are examples of 
creative decisions as reported by the participants: 
 
 Manually breaking of walls, doors and glasses so as to gain access to the seat of fire 
(Sammy, Fire Superintendent Officer, 8, Nigeria; Sunny, Assistant Chief Fire 
Superintendent, 29, Nigeria) 
 Completely removing the roof of a building in order to gain access to the seat of fire 
(Patrick, Assistant Fire Chief, 32, Nigeria) 
 
The above two incidents were instances where the officers in charge could have easily admitted 
to defeat and withdraw their crews. But instead they chose to increase their risk appetite by 
going more offensive, which eventually proved more rewarding.     
(ii) Decisions that were almost completely opposite some of the stipulations in the standard 
operational procedures of the fire service (albeit for a just cause). 
 decision not to withdraw the fire crews to a distance of 200m in an incident involving 
LPG and acetylene cylinders against what was stipulated in firefighting manuals 
(Dickson, crew commander, 27, UK) 
(iii) Decisions that required creating new ideas through improvisation, especially in novel 
circumstances  
 Creatively fastening a mainjet water supply to a wall in order to keep attacking the fire 
while fire crews are safely withdrawn from the immediate environment (Brown, 23, 
Crew commander, UK) 
 Digging a temporary dam for storing water and also liaising with water carriers to 
ensure a steady supply of water in a rural area with extremely low pressured hydrants 
(Darren, station manager, 17, UK)  
 
 
The role of experience in dynamic risk assessment: Evidence from experts’ qualitative 
report 
 
One of the most important objectives of this current study was to identify where and how the 
knowledge for making fireground decisions was obtained. The excerpts in table 3 demonstrate 
how participants reported this experience-based prototypical decision making strategy: 
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Table 3: excerpts showing knowledge source of fireground decision making 
 
Participants’ answers to the question: where and how was 
the information for making fireground decisions obtained 
from? 
Key phrase 
The only way I can describe it is that those incidents contribute to a template, 
and those templates are in your head; just a framework for thinking that you 
call upon instinctively. You may only have 5 or 6 templates perhaps, but most 
of the incidents you go to will fit into one of those templates (Patrick, 
Assistant Fire Chief, 32, UK) 
 
 
 
Insights gained from previous 
incidents 
It was an unusual incident, but something inside you takes over, where you 
go into a mode of professionalism. And it comes because you’ve been doing 
it for that long, and through the training and the knowledge and experience 
you are able to go into a firefighter mode (Brown, Crew Commander, 27, 
UK) 
 
 
 
Experiential knowledge 
I didn’t look at that incident and think this is like any other incident that I 
went to. I take learning points from all the incidents I go to and that, I believe, 
produces an ability to then make decisions (Jade, Crew Commander, 15, UK) 
 
 
Lessons learnt from past 
incidents 
There are some [incidents] that are similar, and some that are not similar, but 
you must remember. Like today, if we attended the same scene and we 
noticed the same building, about 5-7 rooms, and two rooms were not affected, 
we can apply the same method we used there (Adams, 30, CFS, Nigeria) 
 
 
 
Lessons learnt from past 
incidents 
Yes, [you are reminded of previous incidents] but I think it is more of a 
collection of experiences as opposed to a particular incident (Sunny, 29. 
ACFS, Nigeria) 
     
Experiential knowledge  
…..but with 8 years’ experience that I have, following tankers, fighting fires 
everywhere, entering well, entering rivers to rescue, fighting fire, gas fire, 
petrol fire, free burning fire, oil fire. I have attended all. So with those 
experiences not once, not twice, not thrice (Kevin, Watch commander, 8, 
Nigeria) 
 
 
Experiential knowledge  
 
 
 
As shown in Table 3 all the expert participants agreed that dealing with a current problem often 
requires making use of previous knowledge and experiences, mainly by matching cues from 
the environment to the numerous patterns that have been pre-stored in the memory. Prior 
research has evidenced how experienced commanders develop domain knowledge from the 
consistent and repeated experiences they have linked together unconsciously to form a pattern 
(Crandall and Gretchell-Leiter, 1993; Fessey, 2002; Hogarth, 2003; Klein, 2003; Perry and 
Wiggins, 2008). A pattern therefore represents a set of “action scripts” that is chunked together 
and often triggered by one or more internal or external cues. The authors have published this 
cue-action relationship on the fireground elsewhere (see Okoli et al, 2014)  
Discussion and conclusion  
 
Findings from figure 2 showed that experts utilized the three problem solving strategies (i.e. 
standard, adaptive and creative decisions) when solving complex firefighting tasks, of course 
depending on the nature of the incident. Further analysis of the various decision points also 
generated insights regarding the sequence of this arrangement i.e. the conversion that exists 
between the application of rule, skill and knowledge based decisions. For example, Table 2 
showed that rules and procedures seemed to be invoked when performing recurrent or routine 
aspects of tasks (e.g. requesting additional resources), since expected outcomes are mostly 
similar from problem to problem. But in situations where expected outcomes varied from 
problem to problem (non-routine tasks such as carrying out firefighting and rescue tasks on a 
moving train), the experts tended to depend less on rules/procedures and rely more on their 
prototypical and creative ability. These findings therefore give credence to existing beliefs that 
experts seem to understand the boundaries of their skills and when to apply or switch between 
the three strategies as events unfold (Rasmussen, 1983; Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002; 
Kahneman and Klein, 2009). 
 
Specifically, the early research of Polanyi, who has been regarded as the father of tacit 
knowledge provides further explanation to the relationship that exists between rule based, 
adaptive and creative decisions (Polanyi, 1962). Polanyi’s main line of thought was that 
creative acts (or acts of discovery) are imbued with strong personal feelings and commitments, 
and that knowledge is highly dependent on human action — what we termed experiential 
knowledge in this study. In one of his famous books titled Personal Knowledge, Polanyi (1958, 
pp.3) refuted the then dominant belief that science was value-free, arguing instead that the 
informed guesses, gut-feelings and intuitions which are part of exploratory acts are motivated 
by what he called ‘passions’. The assumption that codified or theoretical knowledge (in our 
case rule-based knowledge) is totally objective was therefore the major bone of contention for 
Polanyi. Taking a closer look at how the so called codified knowledge is used in practice, he 
argued that such knowledge is grounded on ‘personal judgments’ and ‘tacit commitments’. 
Since the majority of the decisions experts made were adaptive (63.1%), meaning that the 
standard ways of doing things were in most cases refined and adjusted to suit current goals, it 
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therefore becomes logical to infer that dynamic risk assessment requires making adjustments 
to domain rules, and in some cases making creative decisions through experience. 
 
Furthermore, the qualitative reports in Table 3 provided additional evidence regarding the 
relationship between dynamic risk assessment and experiential knowledge. We strongly 
believe that adaptive decisions reflect both the level of experience and the quality of training 
that officers have been exposed to over the course of their firefighting career. This therefore 
explains, to a large extent, why the experienced fire commanders were able to look at a burning 
building, envision the stairways, elevator shafts and roof supports and then intuitively predict 
what was happening inside, making sense of their implications for task performance. 
Experience was also found to be vital in making critical fire ground decisions such as whether 
to employ an offensive attack or to go defensive, whether to commit crews into a building or 
become more precautionary, whether to allocate more resources at the beginning of an incident 
or wait till a later stage when more information must have been obtained.  
 
Since commanders are aware that generating and/or evaluating a large set of options will likely 
cause the fire to span out of control and then become impossible to manage, some authors have 
shown that they rely instead on their experience to generate a workable option, which is usually 
the first, and possibly the only option they would have to consider (Burke, 1997; Johnson and 
Raab, 2003). Thankfully, a number of scholars have attempted to demystify, through the 
concept of pattern recognition, how experts are able to utilize previous knowledge in solving 
current tasks (Gobet, 2005; McLennan et al, 2006; Lipshitz et al, 2007; Perry and Wiggins, 
2008; Klein, 2008; Harré, Bossomaier, and Snyder, 2012; Klein, 2008). This concept has thus 
been widely utilized in the field of cognitive psychology to explain how professionals are able 
to carry out a quick scan across the large repertoire of patterns in their memory, from which 
they are then able to select the most appropriate ‘action scripts’ that best suit a current situation. 
The expert reports presented in the various sections above and also in Table 3 thus provided a 
useful explanation as to how and why domain experts — even under intense time-pressure, 
shifting goals and incomplete information — are still able to conduct dynamic risk assessments 
rapidly and yet accurately. Experienced firefighters often strive to draw from their rich mental 
model through which they can then describe, explain and predict events better. 
 
The above findings support two of the most prominent theories in the expertise literature: the 
chunking theory (Chase and Simon, 1973) and the template theory (Gobet and Simon, 1996). 
Just as proposed in these theories we found that the amount of templates chunked into an 
expert’s memory is a function of the amount of incidents they have attended in the past, their 
years of experience and their level of exposure to difficult tasks — through which they are then 
able to build up a reservoir of recognized pattern (see Table 1). Previous studies have shown 
that the more patterns people are able to acquire over their years of practice, the more they are 
able to match a new situation to one of the patterns stored in their reservoir of knowledge 
(Shanteau, 1992; Zsambok, 1997; Eraut, 2000; Fessey, 2002; Rosen, Shuffler, and Salas, 
2010). This explains why fire fighters, in real life, could see the colour of a smoke and 
intuitively know that toxic chemicals and other combustible materials are involved.  
 
 
 
Finally, since the ability to effectively conduct dynamic risk assessments on the fireground lies 
in utilizing existing knowledge, which is largely rooted in experience and deliberate practice, 
we therefore recommend that standard operational procedures should be treated as a tool for 
informing rather than one for dictating. The less experienced officers should be made to explore 
various scenarios e.g. training facilitators could design learning tasks for which novices are 
only required to apply basic firefighting rules and those where applying such rules could appear 
counter-productive. It is believed that a training procedure that is heavily focused on making 
rule-based decisions could apparently jeopardize the creative power of professionals, thereby 
slowing down their learning curve.  
 
Future research is needed in this area to further investigate the mode of conversion between 
the rule based, adaptive and creative decision styles across a wider domain of practice.   
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